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The world has changed dramatically since the Department
of Treasury released its Blueprint for a Modernized Financial
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Regulatory Structure in March of 2008.' It has changed in ways
that make the topic of the Blueprint all the more important than it
was a few short months ago. In the midst of a genuine once-in-alifetime global crisis in financial markets, questions about how to
regulate and channel the provision of financial services within and
between jurisdictions have become paramount. It now seems likely that individual countries and international institutions will reconsider the shape of regulation of capital markets in the short- or
intermediate-terms; in fact, much reshaping has already occurred
in the ad hoc responses that regulatory entities and firms have
made in recent moments of acute peril. Such a time is rich with
opportunities for improvement and fraught with potential for mistakes.
As policymakers and scholars have begun struggling with
crisis containment and looking forward to the post-crisis environment, the Blueprint has drifted from center-stage. There are signs,
however, that its focus on regulatory structure is still central to
unfolding policy debates. To the extent that this is true, it is unfortunate. Institutional and regulatory structure can promote effective
regulation, but it is unlikely to do so unless the goals and tools of a
regulatory regime are carefully defined. In calmer periods, other
writers have tried to deemphasize concerns about the allocation of
regulatory functions. During the last round of debates over financial regulatory reforms of the late 1990s, for example, Michael
Taylor and Richard Abrams noted that "institutional structure is a
second order issue."2 In the current, highly-politicized climate,
however, such a claim sounds discordant. As Brunnermeier, et al.
have recently observed, "[t]here is a tendency, commonly observed
amongst politicians, to review the structure of the regulatory sys-

1.

U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED

(2008), availableat http://www.treas.gov/
press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2009) [hereinafter
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE
BLUEPRINT].

2.
Michael Taylor & Richard K. Abrams, Issues in the Unification of
FinancialSector Supervision (International Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
00/213, 2000), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=880886 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009); see also Michael Taylor, The Searchfor a
New Regulatory Paradigm,49 MERCER L. REv. 793 (1998).
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tem before considering the potential instruments to achieve better
regulatory control." 3
The current economic crisis has arguably vindicated the
view that policymakers are mistaken to focus initially on questions
of regulatory structure. There is a reasonable case to be made that
today's crisis is not solely, perhaps not even primarily, due to lack
of coordination among regulators or a misallocation of turf and
regulatory responsibility. It appears likely that a host of different
regulatory actors either failed to perceive fundamental risks or refused to address them. This experience has underscored that two
primary challenges in regulating capital markets are, first, to identify risks within these markets and, second, to identify mechanisms
that can lessen or manage those risks. Questions about how to allocate these mechanisms within a regulatory structure should be
answered in light of policymakers' conclusions regarding what to
regulate and how to regulate it.
The recent crisis will provide a partial roadmap to a better
understanding of the types of risks embedded in different financial
activities. It should now be clearer to policymakers, for example,
that consumer lending is fraught with risks-thus giving rise to
regulatory concerns-that flow well beyond the interests of the
initial parties to these transactions. These risks flow through the
institutions that purchase and pool consumer obligations, institutions that purchase interests in these pooled assets, and others that
buy and sell products that are derivative of these interests. Each of
these subsequent transactions gives rise to distinct risks that implicate parties forward and backward in the chain of relationships. In
the wake of the current crisis, it is also now clearer that institution-

3.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN
FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING

OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, AND ENSURING STABILITY (2009), avail-

able at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-012909-report-regulatory
reform.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter MODERNIZING]; Markus
Brunnermeier, et al., The Fundamental Principles of Financial Regulation, in
GENEVA REPORTS ON THE WORLD ECONOMY I1 (International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, forthcoming 2009) (preliminary draft at ix, available
at http://www.voxeu.org/reports/Geneval l.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009)).
4.
The Congressional Oversight Panel has made this point forcefully.
See MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 46.
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level (that is, micro-prudential) regulation can be in tension with
systemic stability.

It is important, however, for policymakers not to assume
that the particular risks that gave rise to the current crisis will reemerge in the post-crisis context. It is equally important for policymakers not to ignore other fundamental risks inherent in capital
markets that might not have been revealed in recent months. Identifying the full range of risks and potential market failures in domestic and international financial systems requires both a keen
appreciation of economic theory and a comprehensive understanding of the actual practices of market actors. The latter can be anticipated to some extent, but imperfectly. It is simply impossible to
know exactly how financial markets will look when they reemerge
from the current crisis. If policymakers do not wait long enough to
have some meaningful understanding of how private actors will
respond to the crisis, they run the risk of designing a regulatory
system that is weak where it should be strong and strong where it
should be weak.
Assuming that policymakers have an accurate assessment
of the nature of financial firms, products, and services going forward, they must then develop criteria for distinguishing risks that
should be borne by private parties from those that justify regulatory intervention. This will inevitably require a balancing of various
potential policy objectives, such as protecting consumers and investors, promoting an efficient allocation of financial resources,
and ensuring systemic stability. This analysis should be based
upon a realistic assessment of available regulatory tools, such as
activity restrictions, capital adequacy requirements, reserve requirements, conditions on affiliate transactions, disclosure requirements, etc. It should also take into account the potential
modes of interaction between the regulators and the regulated, as
well as improvements in private risk-managements strategies, both
of which may vary across different segments of the re-emergent
financial services sector.
Only after policymakers identify the risks inherent in the
financial system and determine the scope of justifiable regulatory
intervention should they attempt to devise or reform the institutional structure for addressing such risks. Identifying the nature of
risks and determining realistic regulatory goals should help poli5.

See, e.g., Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3.
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cymakers determine the optimal institutional structure for regulating the domestic markets for financial products. By focusing on
questions of institutional structure, the Blueprint and other subsequent proposals put the proverbial cart before the horse. The Blueprint itself proposed a long-term structural solution to divide prudential regulation, market conduct regulation, and financial stability oversight among three different agencies, according to what the
Treasury views as the key policy objectives in the financial services sector. 6 This notion of "objectives-based" regulation is, at this
point, neither sufficiently specific nor substantively justified. Other more recent proposals compound this problem, and still others
are too hasty in proposing specific substantive policies. If policymakers focus initially and immediately on institutional structure or
substantive regulations, they are likely to perpetuate essential misalignments between business realities and regulation; they will
just reallocate this misalignment to different regulatory entities or
regimes.
There are some potential drawbacks and practical challenges to the approach to regulatory reform described above. Delaying the process of reform until after financial markets begin
reemerging may miss an opportunity to shape the re-emergent
markets through regulation. Regulatory actions taken to curtail the
current crisis may constrain the regulatory paths and options available to policymakers in the post-crisis context. The current crisis
may provide a unique opportunity to make comprehensive reforms,
and there may be insufficient political will to do so and to override
powerful special interests once the crisis subsides. Finally, it may
be unreasonable to believe that the kind of comprehensive approach to regulatory reform proposed herein is feasible even where
there is political will to undertake it. Nonetheless, the benefits of a
slower, more deliberate approach to regulatory reform may outweigh those of acting quickly in the midst of financial and economic crisis. Even if policymakers proceed to tackle financial
regulatory reforms in the short-term, the concerns outlined below
may help temper that process.

6.

See BLUEPRINT, supra note 1, at 2.
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I. THE EMERGING LANDSCAPE OF REFORM PROPOSALS
Treasury released its Blueprint in March of 2008, just as
the current economic crisis was beginning to unfold but well before the extent of the crisis was apparent. The Blueprint had been
much anticipated; work on the project was begun in the wake of
conference on "capital markets competitiveness," convened by
Treasury the year before As the Blueprint's executive summary
states, "Conference participants . .. noted that while functioning
well, the U.S. regulatory structure is not optimal for promoting a
competitive financial services sector leading the world and supporting continued economic innovation at home and abroad."8
Within a few short months of its release, however, events had
largely overtaken the Blueprint. Whatever its merits, it quickly
became an open question whether the Blueprint would survive intact as a plausible or compelling plan for future reform of the financial system. In any event, it is now no longer conventional
wisdom that the U.S. regulatory structure is-or was, in recent
years-functioning well.
It may therefore be tempting to disregard the Blueprint or
to treat it as peripheral to current discussion and debate. For a variety of reasons, however, this would be a mistake. Many of the
alternative proposals that have emerged in recent months appear to
respond-directly or indirectly-to the proposals in the Blueprint.9
Furthermore, many of these proposals are not significantly different from the Blueprint in key respects. Perhaps most significantly,
the Blueprint provides a particularly useful retrospective roadmap
of the weaknesses of approaches to financial regulatory reform that
have prevailed over the last decade or so. This Part summarizes
the substance of the Blueprint and briefly discusses some of the
proposals for reforming the U.S. financial regulatory system that
have emerged since the Blueprint was published.

7.
See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Former Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Opening Remarks at Treasury's Capital Markets Competitiveness
Conference at Georgetown University (Mar. 13, 2007) (transcript available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp306.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2009));
BLUEPRINT, supra note 1, at 1.
8.
See BLUEPRINT, supra note 1, at 1.

9. For a detailed discussion of some of the key alternative proposals, see
infra notes 25-86 and accompanying text.
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A. The Blueprint
In addition to articulating a broad "conceptual model for an
optimal regulatory framework,"' discussed below, the Blueprint
sets forth a number of short-term and intermediate-term recommendations. These recommendations do not depend on the structural changes described below, but they would certainly not foreclose such structural reforms. The Blueprint's short-term recommendations include expanding the scope, mission, and composition
of the Presidential Working Group on Financial Markets;" creating
a "mortgage origination commission" that would establish federal
"minimum licensing qualification standards"; and enhancing the
ability of the Federal Reserve to provide liquidity to financial firms
(including non-depository institutions) to ensure market stability.'2
Intermediate-term recommendations include "phasing out" of the
federal thrift charter; rationalizing federal supervision of statechartered banks; creating a charter for "systemically important
payment and settlement systems," which would be regulated and
supervised by the Federal Reserve; creating an optional federal
insurance charter and an Office of National Insurance, which
would regulate federal insurance companies; and merging the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") with the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC")."'
The conceptual model articulated in the Blueprint is much
more forward-looking than the recommendations noted above. It
envisions largely dismantling the current functional arrangement of
regulation that allocates regulation and supervision of distinct financial industries to separate regulatory actors. By way of contrast, the Blueprint describes its conceptual model as "objectivesbased," involving three primary objectives: market stability; "pru10.
See BLUEPRINT, supra note 1, at 2.
11.
This working group is currently composed of the heads of Treasury,
the Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission. Among other things, the Blueprint proposes that the Working Group include the heads of the Office of Comptroller of
the Currency, the Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Federal Deposit Insur-

ance Commission.
12.
See BLUEPRINT, supra note 1, at 5-8.
13.
See id. at 8-13. Currently, the Federal Reserve regulates and supervises state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates and supervises all other
state-chartered banks.
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dential" financial regulation; and regulation of "business conduct.' 4 The Blueprint proposes allocating regulatory functions in
light of these goals. Thus, it proposes that policymakers establish
a market stability regulator, a prudential financial regulator, and a
business conduct regulator.
Under this scheme, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System ("Federal Reserve") would serve as the newly designated market stability regulator.'5 This would essentially extend
the Federal Reserve's current roles. It would have broad powers to
supervise and collect information from financial firms, to take
"corrective action" where market stability required doing so, and to
serve as
a lender of last resort to non-financial and well as financial
16
firms.

The Blueprint envisions creating a prudential financial regulator by merging the functions of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency ("OCC") and the Office of Thrift Supervision
("OTS") and other existing federal-level prudential regulatory entities.' 7 It would have responsibilities relating to financial firms subject to federal government guarantees, especially deposit insurance
but including insurance guarantee funds as well. Among other
things, the prudential regulator would charter "federal insured depository institutions" (as well as "federal insurance institutions,"
which would enjoy federal guarantees under the new scheme), determine permissible activities
for these institutions, and regulate
18
their affiliate relationships.
A business conduct regulator would essentially take over
responsibilities for consumer protection, both regulatory and supervisory. It would regulate conduct by the full range of financial
institutions and would charter some financial firms not within the
chartering authority of the prudential financial regulator.' 9 The
Blueprint's conceptual model also envisions the creation of a corporate finance regulator, which would take over the activities cur-

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
ties such
19.

See id. at 13-14.
See id. at 146-51.
See id.
See id. at 157-70.
See id. at 165-70. It would not regulate government-sponsored entias Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
See id. at 170-78.

2009

A Processfor Reforming FinancialRegulation

889

rently allocated to the SEC and, eventually, those currently allocated to the CFTC as well.20
In sum, the Blueprint's "conceptual model" is primarily a
model of regulatory structure. The essence of this approach is to
reallocate regulatory functions and then to rely on actors within the
new framework to determine the substantive content of financial
regulation within their domain. While this approach is cast in
terms future reforms, it is perhaps more interesting to consider the
Blueprint as one of the last official products of the prevailing precrisis regulatory paradigm. Debate and discussion of regulatory
reform over the last couple of decades has been largely concerned

with determining the appropriate vertical structure of the financial
markets and with mapping the allocation of regulatory functions
onto that structure. In particular, policymakers focused throughout this period on the viability of Glass-Steagall-era separation of
banking and other financial services.2 ' Thus, most of the energy
spent on financial regulatory reform during this period related to
various proposals culminating in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,22
which partially dismantled the Glass-Steagall regime and allocated
the
regulatory authority over financial conglomerates between
Federal Reserve,
Treasury,
federal a
. 23 Much of
thr fdealagencies.
Fedra Reere,
resur, and
nd other
See id. at 21.
20.
The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to §§ 16,
21.
20, 21, and 32 of the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Glass-Steagall Act essentially separated the
ownership and management of depository institutions (commercial banks) and
firms engaged in securities underwriting (investment banks). See id. For a critical analysis of the history and rationale of the Glass-Steagall Act, see, for example, GEORGE J. BENSTON, THE SEPARATION OF COMMERCIAL AND INVESTMENT
BANKING: THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT REVISITED AND RECONSIDERED (1990).
22.
Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is also referred to
as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act repealed two of the four sections of the Glass-Steagall Act and permitted
affiliations, under a financial holding company umbrella, between commercial
and investment banks. Id. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, however, did not
eliminate restrictions on direct securities activities of commercial banks. Id.
23.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act established a system of "functional
regulation" of financial holding companies, under which the Federal Reserve
acts as an "umbrella" regulator and supervisor of the entire conglomerate on a
consolidated basis, the relevant bank regulatory agencies retain primary regulatory and supervisory responsibilities for commercial banking subsidiaries, the
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the scholarship on financial regulation that was not related to these
debates focused on another aspect of regulatory structureespecially the somewhat convoluted arrangement of state and federal financial regulatory actors. 24
B. Subsequent Proposalsand Models
Since the Blueprint was released, a fast-growing number of
writers and organizations have published proposals for reforming
domestic and international regulation of financial markets. Not
surprisingly, many of these subsequent proposals have responded
directly to the unfolding economic crisis and only indirectly to the
Blueprint itself. And whereas the Blueprint is predicated on the
assumption that regulation of the U.S. financial system functions
relatively well, most subsequent proposals assume that the current
regulatory framework in the United States is, as one report puts it,
"a broken system." 5 This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive review of these recent proposals. Such a project is not
particularly useful for present purposes, and it would become obsolete almost immediately. 6 Rather, this section briefly summarizes
a few notable and prominent proposals to illustrate some defining
aspects of the current debate and discussion about financial regulatory reform.
1. The Group of Thirty Report. One prominent example of
the emerging literature on financial regulatory reform is the report
prepared by a steering committee of the Group of Thirty ("G-30"),
chaired by Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve
SEC continues to exercise primary regulatory and supervisory authority over
securities affiliates of such conglomerate, and state insurance regulators continue to oversee insurance underwriting entities within the structure. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1844 (1999); see generally LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL SERVICE AcrivrrEs 258-69 (2004).
24.
See, e.g., Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677 (1988); Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
25.
U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-216, FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR CRAFTING AND ASSESSING PROPOSALS TO
MODERNIZE THE OUTDATED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM (2009) [he-

reinafter GAO-09-216].
26.
In fact, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 passed
last fall by Congress required the Treasury to submit another report by April 20,
2009. See Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 105(c) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5215(c)).
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Board.27 This report addresses financial regulation from an international perspective. As an initial matter, it is noteworthy that the
report makes a point to emphasize that the public sector has a crucial role to play in regulating financial markets.28 This should be
understood as reflecting deep skepticism with the idea that market
discipline can provide adequate and effective regulation of financial markets. Optimism about the potential role of market discipline helped shape financial regulation around the globe over the
past two decades. 29 Not surprisingly, skepticism with this deregulatory impulse is a common aspect of most of the recent proposals
for financial regulatory reform. None reject a role for market discipline altogether, but almost all embrace the idea that there is a
need for meaningful substantive reform of the current framework
for regulation of financial markets.
The recommendations of the G-30 report in turn reflect this
general embrace of a robust governmental role in regulating financial markets. It recommends, among other things, imposing "the
highest international standards" on "the largest and most complex
banking organizations"; ensuring that non-bank financial institutions are subject to "some form of formal prudential regulation and
supervision"; improving the infrastructure of the financial system
(for example, clearing and payment systems); avoiding regulatory
approaches "that may inadvertently reinforce . . . excessive ex-

uberance or risk aversion"; promoting "well-balanced" executive
compensation; improving the structure of regulatory agencies responsible for crisis response; ensuring a meaningful degree of
27.

THE GROUP OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM: A FRAMEWORK FOR

FINANCIAL STABILITY (2009), availableat http://www.group30.org/pubs/reform

report.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
28.
See THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 17.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE
29.

TURNER REviEw: A

39-49 (2009), available at http://media.ft.com/cms/9fc3926e-13b7-1 de-9e32-0000779fd2ac.pdf
(last visited Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW] (reviewing the fundamental theoretical assumptions on which the regulatory approaches of the past
twenty-thirty years were based); see also Michael Mah-Hui Lim, Old Wine in
New Bottles: Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis-Causes and Consequences, 3 J.
APPLIED RES. AccT. & FIN. 3-13 (2008); Anthony Faiola, Ellen Nakashima &
Jill Drew, What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A01; Erik Lipton
& Steven Labaton, The Reckoning: DeregulatorLooks Back, Unswayed, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 16, 2008, at Al.
REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS
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coordination and consistency of regulatory approaches across the
globe, especially for institutions operating trans-nationally; improving governance and risk management by financial institu31
tions.
In light of these guiding principles, the G-30 report makes
four core recommendations. First, it proposes to eliminate "gaps
and weaknesses in the coverage of prudential regulation and supervision.' In practice, this would entail extending prudential
regulation and supervision to all "systematically significant financial institutions., 3' Thus, for example, it would require limiting
ownership of government-insured depository institutions to regulated entities and would likely extend prudential regulation to at
least some money market mutual funds and to at least some hedge
funds. The second core recommendation is to improve "the quality
and effectiveness" of prudential regulation and supervision.33 This
would entail creating a regulatory framework that affords "higher
levels of national and international policy coordination." In this
regard, the report specifically recommends that countries rationalize their financial regulatory structures and consider allocating
regulation of market stability to their central banks.
The third G-30 recommendation is to strengthen "standards
for governance, risk management, capital, and liquidity., 35 In this
regard, the report focuses on the potential dangers of "pro-cyclical
effects" of regulation and recommends raising capital requirement
that dampen pro-cyclicality. 36 The report also recommends that
policymakers adopt "fair value accounting" of financial assets,
which would not require strict "marking to market" of these assets. 37 Finally, the G-30 report recommends making financial markets "more transparent," aligning "risk and prudential incentives.
Here the report focuses largely on the need to "restor[e] confidence

30.
See THE GROUP OF THIRTY,
31.
See id. at 21.
32.
This category is defined in
"interconnectedness," and relationship
33.
See THE GROUP OF THIRTY,
34.
See id. at 34.
35.
See id. at 40-46.
36.
See id. at 42-43.
37.
See id. at 44-45.
38.
See id. at 48-56.

supra note 27, at 17-20.
the report as a function of size, leverage,
to infrastructure.
supra note 27, at 34-38.
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in securitized credit markets."3 9 This would in turn involve pressing financial firms to improve credit underwriting standards; reforming credit-rating practices; improving, or imposing, regulation
and supervision of over-the-counter markets and products like credit default swaps.
2. The Government Accountability Office Report. In January of 2009, the U.S. Government Accountability Office ("GAO")
issued a report on financial regulatory reform.4° This report primarily addresses what it describes as "the fragmented and complex
arrangement" of actors with regulatory functions affecting U.S.
financial markets.41 It emphasizes that this framework has "gaps"
where large financial entities do not fall within the jurisdiction of
any existing regulatory actors.42 Similarly, the report observes that
various regulatory actors have failed to respond to market developments in financial products.
According to the GAO, the existing allocation of regulatory
functions constitutes one of the fundamental weaknesses of the
current system of financial-sector regulation in the United States.
As the report states, "recent events clearly have shown that the
fragmented U.S. regulatory structure contributed to failures by the
existing regulators to adequately protect consumers and ensure
financial stability. 43 It proposes that policymakers clarify the
goals of financial regulation; provide comprehensive regulatory
coverage of financial activities; improve the ability of financial
regulators to address systemic factors, perhaps by designating a
market stability regulator; build a greater degree of flexibility into
the regulatory system, perhaps allowing regulators to wait to intervene in markets "until it becomes clear that a particular activity or
market poses a significant risk";4 minimize regulatory burdens on
financial markets where possible; and improve consumer and investor protections.
3. The Congressional Oversight Panel Report. The Congressional Oversight Panel ("the Panel") was created by Congress
in October of 2008 to oversee the U.S. government's efforts to
contain and resolve the current crisis and to evaluate the existing
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See id. at 48-49.
GAO-09-216, supra note 25.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 54.
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framework of financial regulation. 4' Among other things, Congress
specifically charged the Panel to determine "whether any participants in the financial markets that are currently outside the regulatory system should become subject to the regulatory system ...
46
and whether there are any gaps in existing consumer protections.
In January of 2009, the Panel issued a report identifying
past and current weakness of the U.S. financial regulatory system
and recommending a number of areas in need of reforms.4 7 It is
particularly noteworthy that the Panel disagreed with those who
suggest that the underlying problems with U.S. financial regulation
stem primarily from the regulatory structure. As the Panel states:
Structural and organizational problems are certainly
important .... But at root, the regulatory failure
that gave rise to the current crisis was one of philosophy more than structure. In too many cases,
regulators had the tools but failed to use them. And
where tools were missing, regulators too often
failed to ask for the necessary authority to develop
what was needed.48
In general, the Panel's report strongly criticizes the trend
over recent decades to embrace deregulatory policies and the
emergence of essentially unregulated market actors and activities.
It identifies three primary problems with the existing framework: it
fails to effectively manage risks, to require sufficient disclosure,
and to ensure "fair-dealing." 49 The Panel's report offers eight particular proposals for reform: "[i]dentify and regulate financial institutions that pose systemic risk"; "[l]imit excessive leverage in
American financial institutions"; "[i]ncrease supervision of the
shadow financial system"; "[c]reate a new system for federal and
state regulation of mortgages and other consumer credit products";
"[c]reate executive pay structures that discourage excessive risk
taking"; "[r]eform the credit rating system"; "[m]ake establishing a

45.
See Congressional Oversight Panel, http:llcop.senate.gov/aboutl (last
visited Apr. 11, 2009).
46.
MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 6-7.
47.
Id.
48.
Id. at 19.
49.
Id. at7.
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global financial regulatory floor a U.S. diplomatic priority"; and
"[pilan for the next crisis."50
4. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation Recommendations. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation
("Committee"), an independent group of industry leaders and academics, released a set of recommendations on financial regulatory
reform in January of 2009."' The Committee's recommendations
focus almost exclusively on reforming the structure of financial
regulation in the United States. It strongly advocates reducing the
number of domestic financial regulatory entities and allocating
existing functions to a small group of surviving entities. In particular, the Committee recommends that the United States should
have only two or three independent financial regulators: the Federal Reserve; a U.S. "Financial Services Authority" ("USFSA"),
modeled on the United Kingdom's recently-created Financial Services Authority ("UK FSA");52 and, perhaps, an "investor/consumer protection agency. 53
The Committee would allocate to the Federal Reserve responsibilities for setting monetary policy, providing liquidity to
financial market as a lender of last resort, and establishing capital
requirements for financial institutions.M The USFSA "would regulate all aspects of the financial system," and would thus be respon50.

Id.

51.

COMMIrTEE

ON

CAPITAL

MARKETS

REGULATION,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REORGANIZING THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY

STRUCTURE (2009), available at http://www.capmktsreg. org/pdfs/ CCMR%20%20Recommendations%20for%2OReorganizing%20the%20US%2ORegulatory
%20Structure. pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
The UK FSA is a unified regulator with broad jurisdiction over the
52.
UK's financial services industry, which was established in 1997 by combining
the functions and staff of nine different regulatory and self-regulatory bodies.
For a detailed analysis of the UK FSA's creation, operation, and regulatory and
supervisory philosophy, see, for example, Eilis Ferran, Examining the United
Kingdom's Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 257 (2003); Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of
Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24
YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2007); Heidi Mandanis Schooner & Michael Taylor,
United Kingdom and United States Responses to the Regulatory Challenges of
Modem FinancialMarkets, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 317 (2003).
COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, supra note 51, at
53.
5-6.
54. Id.
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sible for functions currently conducted by the OCC, the OTS, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the SEC, and the
CFTC." The Committee further proposes that the Treasury coordinate the activities of these two (or three) entities.5 6 The Committee was apparently split on whether the Federal Reserve or the new
USFSA would have responsibility for supervision of financial institutions.57 It proposes three options: giving this responsibility to
the Federal Reserve; giving it to the USFSA; or giving most of this
responsibility to the USFSA and having the Federal Reserve supervise "systemically important" financial institutions. 8
5. The "Geneva" Report. A group of economists participating in a conference co-sponsored by the International Center for
Monetary and Banking Studies and the Centre for Economic Policy Research recently released a conference draft, The Fundamental
Principlesof FinancialRegulation. 9 These writers argue that the
current framework of financial regulation has been overly concerned with regulating the activities of institutions (microprudential) and insufficiently concerned with regulating aspects of
institutional behavior that can give rise to negative systemic externalities (macro-prudential). 60 They observe various ways in which
transactions or policies that promote the performance and solvency
of individual institutions can themselves create systemic instability. "It is possible, indeed often likely, that attempts by individual
institutions to remain solvent can push the system into collapse.'
Significant for present purposes, these writers propose an
approach to regulatory reform in addition to substantive goals and
principles. "What is needed is, first, a restatement of the basic objectives of financial regulation and, then, an assessment of whether
the current regulatory framework is well structured to attain such
objectives, and, if not, to explore what can be done to restructure
such regulation so that it does. 62 Pursuant to this approach, they
propose that regulators classify financial institutions

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at7.
Id. at 8-9.
Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 1.
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based on objective risk measures that capture the
risk-spillovers from one institution to the next ....
The fault line of regulation should be primarily determined by the institution's actions and assetliability structure, while its legal identity as a bank,
insurance company, SIV, etc. should only play a
secondary role. 63
They further propose three categories of institutions based on this
classification--"individually systemic" institutions; institutions
that are "systemic as part of a herd" (for example, hedge funds);
"non-systemic large" institutions (for example, insurance companies and pension funds); and what they refer to as "tinies." 64 According to these writers, only the first two categories implicate macro-prudential concerns. They also argue that policymakers adopt66
65
counter-cyclical regulations, police for "maturity mismatches,"
allow financial firms to adopt "mark to funding" accounting prac6'76
tices, and impose capital charges for liquidity risk. With respect
to regulatory structure, they argue that policymakers should adopt
a "twin peaks" approach with a combination of micro- and macroprudential regulators.
6. Pedersen & Roubini. Lasse Pedersen and Nouriel Roubini, professors at New York University's Stem School of Business, recently offered a proposal for financial regulation that appeared in the Financial Times.69 Their proposal is primarily designed to prevent financial crises, not to redesign financial regulation in general. In this regard, it is narrower in scope than the proposals and recommendations discussed above. It is properly included with these other proposals, however, especially because it
addresses what most proposals consider a fundamental challenge
of financial regulation. Pedersen and Roubini's proposal is elegantly simple. It employs an existing measure of a bank's likelih63.
64.

Id. at 23.
Id. at24.

65.
66.
67.
68.

See id. at ch. 4.
See id. at ch. 5.
See id.
See id.

69.
Lasse Pedersen & Nouriel Roubini, A Proposalto Prevent Wholesale
Financial Failure, FIN. TIMES,
Jan.
29,
2009, available at
http://www.ft.comlcmslsOI4dOadd58-ee27-1 ldd-b791-0000779fd2ac.html.
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ood of contributing to financial crisis and then uses that measure to
determine how much capital each bank should be required to hold.
Banks would also be required to purchase insurance against the
extent of systemic risk they pose.70 The beneficiary of this insurance would be whichever financial regulator is responsible for addressing and containing financial crisis.' The government would
participate in this scheme as a partial insurer. According to Pedersen and Roubini, the insurance scheme "would provide incentives
for a bank to limit systemic risk (to lower its insurance premium),
provide a market-based estimate of the risk (the cost of insurance),
and reduce the fiscal costs and the moral hazard of government
bail-outs
(because the company does not get the insurance pay72
off)."

. 7. U.S. Official Sector. As this Article is going to print, the
new Obama administration has made it clear that it considers
reform of financial regulation a near- to intermediate-term priority. 73 In February of 2009, President Obama gave a speech that he
characterized as "a critical first step in developing [a] framework"
for a new financial regulatory regime. 74 In this speech, he charged
his economic advisors to "develop recommendations for regulatory
reform... to collaborate with [Congress] ... so that they can start
crafting legislation in the coming weeks and months., 75 He identified a set of "core principles": heightened oversight of systemically
significant institutions; strengthening the regulatory and financial
70. Id.
71.
Id.
72.
Id.
73.
It also apparent that the U.S. Administration is experiencing pressure
from the international community to make quick progress toward reforming the
regulation of financial markets. In April of this year, the G-20 countries agreed
to address their respective domestic financial regulations. See The Group of
Twenty [G-20], The Global Plan for Recovery and Reform: the Communique
the
London
Summit
(Apr.
2,
2009),
available at
from
("We
http://www.londonsumiit.gov.uk/resources/en/PDF/final-communique
each agree to ensure our domestic regulatory systems are strong."). The G-20
countries specifically agreed, among other things, to extend "regulation and
oversight" to "systemically important hedge funds." See id.
See Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech Outlining
74.
Financial Regulatory Reform (Feb. 25, 2009) (transcript available at
http://www.realclearpolitics.conarticles/2009/02/obama-outlinesfinancial-reg
ul.html).
75.
Id.
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system so that particular financial institutions are not too big to
fail; "openness, transparency, and plain language"; "strong and
uniform supervision of financial products marketed to investors
and consumers" not based "on abstract models created by the institutions themselves"; executive accountability; elimination of regulatory
gaps; and the promotion of strong regulations international6
ly.

7

Two weeks later, Ben Bemanke, Chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board, gave a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations
in which he discussed broad principles for financial regulatory
reform." "[I]t is not too soon for policymakers to begin thinking
about the reforms to the financial architecture, broadly conceived,
that could help prevent a similar crisis from developing in the future.,

78

He identified four key aims of such reform: 1) address the

problem that some financial firms have become too big to fail; 2)
improve the financial infrastructure; 3) limit pro-cyclicality in regulation; and 4) consider creating a systemic risk regulator. 79 To

limit the chances that firms become too big to fail, Bernanke argued that regulators should adopt policies that improve risk management and monitoring, that consolidate supervision of big holding companies, and that improve the way non-bank financial firm
failures are resolved. Bernanke also asserted that improving financial infrastructure requires new approaches to clearing and settling
complex financial instruments and addressing weakness in the
money-market funds.80
Following President Obama and Bernanke's statements,
Timothy Geithner, Secretary of the Treasury, announced a set of
proposals for reforming U.S. financial regulation in testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Financial Services Committee." Geithner stated that addressing failures in the financial
76.

Id.

77.
See Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Financial Reform to Address Systematic Risk, Speech Before the
Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechl
bernanke200903 10a.htm).

78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.

81.
See Overhauling Financial Regulations: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Financial Serv., 11 th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Timothy Geithner,
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regulatory system "will require comprehensive reform. Not modest repairs at the margin, but new rules of the game." In this spirit, Geithner outlined a number of proposals that were generally
consistent with the previous statements by President Obama and
Bernanke noted above. He articulated four general, and now familiar, areas of regulatory concern: "systemic risk, consumer and
investor protection, eliminating gaps in our regulatory structure[,]
and international coordination. ' 3 Geithner's testimony focused,
however, on proposals to address concerns over systemic risk, including the establishment of "a single entity with responsibility for
systemic stability over the major institutions and critical payment
and settlement systems and activities." He also proposed to address systemic risk by adopting "more conservative capital requirements," requiring large hedge funds to register with the SEC,
and imposing regulations on the over-the-counter derivatives. 5
Perhaps most controversially, Geithner proposed giving federal
regulators the kind of authority to address and resolve failures of
non-bank financial firms that they currently have to resolve insolvent banks. 6
C. General Themes
While there is a significant amount of variation in the numerous recent proposals for financial reform, and while most tend
somewhat toward the broad and the abstract, there are three noteworthy general themes that emerge from the current discussion and
debate on the topic. First, this discussion continues to place a
strong emphasis on questions of regulatory structure-the framework of regulatory actors and the allocation of regulatory functions. Some proposals are particularly robust in this respect, like

United
States
Secretary
of
the
Treasury),
available
at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releasesltg71.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2009);
Damian Paletta & Jenny Strasburg, Treasury Maps New Era of Regulation,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at Al, availableat http://online.wsj.con/article/
SB 123811201096853207.html.
82.
See OverhaulingFinancialRegulations,supra note 81.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. Notably, this articulation suggests that a new entity be created
rather than, say, extending new responsibilities to the Federal Reserve.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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that of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation." Although
other proposals do not focus as concretely on structural concerns,
these concerns continue to be an important component of most
proposals. Many commentators follow the Blueprint in calling, for
example, for creating or designating an entity that will take primary responsibility for market or systemic stability. Others appear to
mean something similar, at least in part, by arguing for a greater
The need for macrofocus on macro-prudential regulation.
prudential regulation or for systemic risk-management, after all,
suggests the need for a regulatory actor to serve this function.
Second, most of the recent literature on financial regulatory
reform tends to respond to the determinants of the current crisis
and regulatory reforms that will address these problems. Either
explicitly or implicitly, most of these recent proposals reflect concerns about the regulation of hedge funds, derivatives, mortgage
origination, and credit rating entities-actors and activities that
comprise the contemporary list of culprits. They similarly focus on
regulatory failures such as "gaps" in the regulatory framework,
pro-cyclical aspects of existing regulation, weaknesses in capital
requirements, and lax oversight of lending standards. In other
words, it seems fair to characterize much of the current discussion
of financial regulatory reform as having a distinctly retrospective
gaze, even where proposals are cast in prospective terms.
Third, the recent body of literature on financial regulation
tends to convey a sense that there is a pressing, if not immediate,
need for comprehensive reform in this area. There is a political
dimension to this sense of urgency. As the crisis deepens and extends, policymakers, especially elected officials, may feel strong
pressures to take clear, immediate, and decisive actions to show
that they are responsive to current conditions. This political factor
may be heightened as a new federal administration takes office and
wants to be seen to repudiate the actions or inaction of the previous
regime. There is also a practical dimension to this sense of urgency, an assessment that comprehensive reforms are only possible in
the midst, or in the immediate wake, of crisis and disruption. It is
important to note, however, that not all commentators share this
sense of urgency. As the authors of the Geneva Report write, "hasty responses can have unintended consequences, and can focus on

87.

See COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS

REGULATION,

supra note 51.
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issues that have the greatest public profile, as opposed to the most
significant practical impact."88
II. TOWARD AN APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM

The prevailing themes of the current debate about financial
regulation discussed above have the potential to distort any process
for meaningful reform. Recent experience will inevitably influence any reform process, but policymakers should guard against a
retrospective impulse. Approaching comprehensive reform of financial regulation with particular structural and substantive reforms already in mind may increase the chances that policymakers
will make consequential mistakes at a crucial juncture. Furthermore, the sense of urgency over the need to make significant reforms in the near-term greatly increases the chance that policymakers will make such mistakes.
This Part proposes an approach to financial regulatory
reform that aims to resist these tendencies of the current discussions on the subject. As explained below, any meaningful reform
of financial regulation should proceed first from a comprehensive
understanding of the domestic and international financial markets
that will emerge from the current crisis. Many of the current proposals are based upon accumulated knowledge of financial firms
and markets and build upon an extensive body of scholarship on
financial regulation. But a comprehensive process of reform
would ideally start with a critical, fine-grained empirical reexamination of developments in the financial sector. 9 Furthermore,
nearly all of the current knowledge and scholarship about financial
markets is based on conditions leading up to the current crisis. It is
entirely reasonable to expect that market actors will adjust their
behavior in light of the recent crisis. A reformed framework of
financial regulation should be designed with reference to the actual, on-going nature of the firms and the activities to be regulated.
Finally, regulatory and supervisory functions should be allocated
(or reallocated) in a way that will maximize the effectiveness of
substantive rules identified as necessary or desirable in light of
88.
Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 45.
89.
See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 318-19 (1982)
(noting that "empirical investigation [of the industry or program to be reformed]
is necessary because existing studies, while academically satisfactory, often
suffer from inadequate information" or are out-of-date).
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trends and developments in the aftermath of the current financial
crisis.
A. Developing a Regulatory Paradigm
Much of the current literature and discussion on financial
regulation argues or assumes that there is a need to dramatically
overhaul financial regulation in the United States and internationally. Largely missing from the current discussion, however, is any
proposal for how policymakers should determine whether significant reforms are needed in the first place or how to proceed with
reforms if they are needed. Ideally, the answers to questions of
whether and how to proceed with reform should be determined by
a coherent, deliberate approach. In other words, principles of the
reform process should be identified before substantive principles
of regulation are embraced.
In general, surprisingly few scholars or policymakers have
attempted to articulate normative accounts of the process of regulatory change. 90 Writing over twenty-five years ago, while still an
academic, Stephen Breyer noted that "there is no widely accepted
systematic account of the difficulties that accompany the effort to
tackle problems through the use of regulation."9' Breyer's Regulation and Its Reform remains perhaps the best attempt to articulate a
general approach or framework for the process of adopting and
reforming regulation. In that book, he proposed the following approach: study in detail the activity to be regulated, identify policy
those objecobjectives, examine potential methods for achieving
92
tives, and then choose the preferable method.
90. Broadly speaking, most scholarship on regulation and administrative
law has tended to focus instead on more substantive questions, including debates
over deregulation and cost-benefit analysis. For a good summary of the vast
literature on regulation, see JEFFREY L. HARRISON, THOMAS D. MORGAN, &
PAUL R. VERKUIL, REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS

(2d ed. 2004). It should be noted that the public choice literature does focus on
the process of adopting and reforming regulation, attributing that process to
factors of political economy, especially interest-group politics. See, e.g., JAMES
BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962); DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991); BARRY M.
MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING, DESIGNING,

AND REMOVING REGULATORY FoRMs (1982).
91.
BREYER, supra note 89, at 5.

92.

See id.
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In a similar vein, Michael Taylor, a financial analyst and
former staff member at the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"),
has described an approach to reforming financial regulation in particular. 93 Taylor called for rethinking of what he referred to as the
"traditional regulatory paradigm" in the financial services sector,
which was deeply rooted in the business and legal realities of the
1930s. He argued for developing a new paradigm that would reflect the changes in the underlying structure of the modem financial industry. 94 Taylor was primarily criticizing the Glass-Steagall
regime of U.S. financial regulation95 and suggesting that this regulatory arrangement had been outstripped by developments in financial markets. His work was directed at a different debate over financial regulation than the current one, yet his description of an
approach to financial regulatory redesign stands out as one of the
most useful discussions on the topic in recent years.
Relying explicitly on Thomas Kuhn's famous work on paradigms and paradigm change,96 Taylor defined a "regulatory para-

digm" as a combination of three major elements: 1) broad public
policy objectives set for the regulatory system; 2) institutional arrangements for administering the set of regulatory requirements
flowing from the policy objectives; and 3) specific regulatory methods and techniques used by the agencies entrusted with the task
of implementing the regulation.97 The first element in this definition, public policy objectives underlying a system of financial regulation, includes, among other things, "basic assumptions about the
trade-off between efficiency and stability and the extent to which
the government could or should seek to indemnify consumers
against risk." 98 These policy decisions generally involve normative

judgments and are informed by various theories regarding the nature of the regulated industry and the potential dangers of leaving it
unregulated.
The second element in Taylor's definition of a regulatory
paradigm, the institutional arrangements, includes, for example,
93.

See Michael Taylor, The Search for a New Regulatory Paradigm,49

MERCER L. REv. 793 (1998).

94.
95.
96.
(1970).
97.
98.

Id. at 793.
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
See Taylor, supra note 93, at 794.
See id.
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"the manner in which regulation is organized, the basis on which
agencies are structured, and the type and nature of the powers that
are conferred on them."" Finally, the last element of Taylor's notion of regulatory paradigm, the methods and techniques used by
regulators to discharge their tasks, encompasses, among other issues, "the type and nature of the information that regulators gather
from regulated firms, the standards they apply and the methods
they use to ensure compliance with those standards, and matters
like the kinds of knowledge and expertise regulatory personnel
must possess."' °
Focusing primarily on banking, Taylor used this framework
to argue that the then-existing system of regulation was based on a
set of assumptions about the structure and the operation of the financial services sector dating back to the Great Depression era.101
Taylor argued that this framework had failed to keep pace with the
changes in the global financial market, especially in the period
starting in the 1980s. °2 This assessment was consistent with much
of the criticism of financial regulation at the time, which helped lay
the foundation for the significant reforms of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act of 1999.03 According to Taylor and others, the traditional regulatory paradigm, at least as it applied to the banking
field, reflected the New Deal's strong policy preference for preserving financial stability at the expense of promoting competition. 1°4 Restrictions on bank activities, government guarantees, and
deposit insurance were designed in large part to address risks to the
financial system. This fundamental policy objective also shaped

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 795.
Id. at 800.
For a sampling of common criticisms of the Glass-Steagall regime,

see, for example, U.S.

DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM, U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE

COMPETITIVE BANKS (1991); Daniel R. Fischel, Andrew M. Rosenfield & Robert S. Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 VA.
L. REV. 301 (1987); Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains:A Perspective
on Bank Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REv. 501 (1989);
Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The
Revisionist Role of the Courts in FederalBanking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV.

672 (1987).
104. Taylor, supra note 93, at 795.
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the institutional structure of the financial services regulation and
supervision conducted largely along sectoral lines and based on
"clear segmentation of markets and products between debt, equity,
and insurance contracts."'' 5 Finally, periodic assessment of banks'
capital adequacy, viewed as a standardized measurement of individual institutions' prudential soundness, became the central technique of supervising banks under the traditional paradigm.
By the end of the twentieth century, the financial services
industry had entered the period of a revolutionary change in the
conduct of its business, which arguably eroded the foundations of
this regulatory paradigm.'06 Mainly as a result of technological
innovation and deregulation in recent decades, the financial system
had become more profitable, competitive, and volatile. However,
the basic assumptions built into the regulatory framework remained unquestioned, and the full regulatory implications of the
radical transformation in the risk profile of modem financial institutions were not sufficiently understood or even acknowledged. 7
Taylor's call to arms was clear:
Only if we recognize that we are in the middle of a
regulatory paradigm change can we begin to deal
with what appears to be the crisis of regulation in
the developed economies. This means to be prepared to think radical thoughts about the aims,
scope, and techniques of regulation.'08
Today, twelve years after the publication of Michael Taylor's essay, we have yet to rise to this challenge. In the wake of
what is commonly understood to be the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression, it is now painfully apparent that policymak105.
106.

Id. at 795.
According to Taylor:
[T]he increased emphasis by banks on trading activities, the
globalization of their activities, and their incorporation into
diversified conglomerate group structures conducting a range
of banking, securities, and insurance business, as well as the
blurring of distinctions between debt, equity, and insurance
contracts, all necessitate a rethinking of the traditional regulatory paradigm.

Id. at 798.
107. Id. at 800.
108. Id. at 797.
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ers need to grasp fully the depth and breadth of paradigmatic
changes in the financial industry to address the resulting weaknesses of the regulatory framework. Yet, doing so requires a comprehensive, holistic approach to the reform process, rather than a
set of distinct structural or substantive "fixes" to the system.
B. The Approach
The frameworks set forth by Breyer and Taylor provide
useful points of departure for developing an approach to, or
process for, meaningful reform of financial regulation. Both suggest that a financial regulatory paradigm should be determined by
the nature of the financial industries that it will regulate. Rules and
regulations should be crafted to respond to the risks created by
products, services, and activities. Regulatory structure should then
be designed to implement the rules and regulations deemed to be
desirable. While most contemporary commentators on financial
regulation would likely agree with these points, they appear to
overlook an important implication of this approach-that a change
in the regulatory paradigm must be predicated on a comprehensive
understanding of the prospective risks in the financial sector.
The process of redrawing the U.S. financial regulatory
framework should be strategically sequenced. Effective regulatory
modernization should start with an assessment of the actual arrangements of the financial sector and the behavior of market participants. Thus, current proposals regarding the regulation of specific products or market segments (such as credit default swaps,
asset securitization, mortgage lending, and hedge funds) skip a
crucial step of assessing system-wide dynamics affecting these
market segments and the ongoing risks posed by particular financial products, especially as these dynamics and risks may evolve in
the wake of the current crisis. If policymakers move directly to
reform regulatory structure or substantive rules without a finegrained assessment of the forces behind specific instances of market failure and of the post-crisis shifts in market practice, they risk
adopting regulatory reforms that are either incomplete or tailored
to obsolete circumstances. Emphasizing the particular determinants of the current crisis may cause policymakers to underestimate the likelihood that private market actors will adjust to the
effects of the bursting of the latest asset bubble by redirecting the
flow of capital, and risk, elsewhere.
An approach grounded primarily or exclusively in the recent experience is inherently reactive and retrospective in its focus
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and ignores the likelihood that the post-crisis market will emerge
in ways that create the potential for unfamiliar market failures and
systemic risks. °9 Thus, it is desirable that any process of designing
a new financial regulatory regime or paradigm be delayed for as
long as it takes the global financial system to stabilize and for the
contours of re-emerging financial markets to begin to take shape.
At the very least, it should be delayed as long as it takes to conduct
a meaningful post-crisis inventory of financial markets.
It is worth noting that there are additional, perhaps independent, reasons for resisting the temptation to embark immediately upon significant structural or substantive reforms to the existing
system of financial regulation. Chief among these is the fact that
the United States is in a moment of financial and economic crisis
and crisis-containment. In any context, hurried sweeping reforms
may increase the chances of future regulatory failure. This danger
may be elevated where the subject of regulation is still roiling in
crisis. In recent months, a number of writers have explored the
legal and regulatory implications of the current efforts to contain
and, hopefully, resolve economic crisis. " ° Much of this work has
been focused on actual and potential responses to the current crisis
and has evaluated the legal bases for these responses or approaches. Anna Gelpern has made an important contribution to this literature, arguing that crisis containment should be understood as a
See, e.g., Anil K. Kashyap, Raghuram G. Rajan & Jeremy C. Stein,
109.
Rethinking Capital Regulation (Aug. 2008) (unpublished paper prepared for the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Symposium on "Maintaining Stability in a
Changing Financial System," available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/
publicat/sympos/2008/KashyapRajanStein.03.12.09.pdf) (arguing that reform
proposals motivated by specific aspects of the current crisis are inherently limited in their ability to prevent future ones).
110. Anna Gelpern, FinancialCrisis Containment (Working paper, 2009)
(on file with the authors); Anna Gelpern & Adam Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: The Workout Prohibition in Residential Mortgage-Backed Se-

curities (Working paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstractid=1323546 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial

Meltdown

of

2008

(Working

paper,

2009),

available

at

http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1301164 (last visited Apr.
13, 2009); David T. Zaring & Steven M. Davidoff, Big Deal: The Government's
Response to the Financial Crisis (Working paper, 2009), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1306342
12, 2009).

(last visited Apr.
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distinct legal or regulatory enterprise."' Using historical examples,
she illustrates that containment involves a recurring set of policy
choices." 2 These choices include determining whether responses
should be wholesale or ad hoc and distributing the ex post costs of
containment.
For present purposes, the crucial point of Gelpem's work is
this: crisis containment is categorically different from regulation or
regulatory reform. As she writes:
Containment measures are often conflated with financial regulation, crisis prevention and resolution.
Unlike containment, these are long-term projects
that share the goal of entrenching sound economic
incentives, often embodied in positive rules. In
contrast, containment is urgent and brief, defined by
rule-breaking, claims of exception and the dearth of
positive law. The paramount goal is 'to stop the
bleeding'; the long view falls by the wayside."3
Gelpem's work on containment does not explicitly aim to
propose an appropriate sequence of, or timing for, containment,
resolution and regulation. It is entirely possible, for example, that
policy-makers could pursue containment and regulatory reforms
concurrently; Gelpern's point is that these projects should be carefully distinguished. Her work provides a strong basis, however,
for caution against attempting to conduct long-term regulatory policy-making or reform while engaging in crisis-containment. At the
very least, doing so creates significant risk that containment and
regulation will be confused with each other in ways that undermine
both projects. This is especially troubling if containment policies
are likely to be in tension with "peacetime" regulatory approaches.

111.
Anna Gelpern, FinancialCrisis Containment (Working paper, 2009)
(on file with the authors) (citations omitted).
112.
For another insightful analysis and a taxonomy of crisis containment
policies pursued by governments of different countries in recent years, see
Charles W. Calomiris, Daniela Klingebiel & Luc Laeven, FinancialCrisis Policies and Resolution Mechanisms: A Taxonomy from Cross-CountryExperience,

in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: CONTAINMENT
Honohan & Luc Laeven eds., 2005).
113.
Gelpern, supra note 111 at 6.
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This Article expands on Gelpern's work in arguing that crisis containment and regulatory reform should be separated not only
conceptually but temporally as well. In other words, regulatory
reform should, ideally, not be conducted at the same time as policymakers are attempting to contain a crisis. To some extent, this is
due to factors that Gelpern describes--containment likely requires
actions that are inconsistent with effective long-term or peacetime
regulation.114 Containing a crisis will be difficult enough on its
own. It may be even more difficult to take such containment actions that are in direct tension with a regulatory framework proposed for the post-crisis period. "5 Furthermore, tackling containment and regulatory reform concurrently may increase the possibility that regulatory policymaking will be distorted by the politics of
containment, especially if policymakers are concerned about the
legal bases for their containment measures.
Imagine, for example, that policymakers suppose that a future regime should explicitly grant an agency authority to intervene
in certain types of transactions (say, to void a contractual obligation). Proposing such a rule might be construed as an admission
that the agency does not currently have the authority to take actions that may be important for containing the current crisis. Finally, there are other, perhaps more practical reasons to treat the
projects of crisis-containment and regulatory reform as separate
and sequential processes. Until a crisis is contained, it may simply
not be possible to determine which firms will survive the crisis,
what types of activities they will conduct, and what types of risks
they will pose.
The unique significance of the current historic juncture
magnifies all of these concerns. It would be a shame to waste this
rare, and real, opportunity to transform the system of financial services regulation by diverting legislators' attention and energy toward partial, insufficient, or misguided solutions. Thus, a compre114. Importantly, the immediate crisis containment measures frequently
remain a part of the long-term policy responses and shape the post-crisis regulatory outcomes. See Calomiris, Klingebiel, & Laeven, supra note 112, at 28.
The proposal by Secretary Geithner to expand the resolution authority
115.
of federal regulators provides a helpful illustration of this possibility. Although
this authority may be necessary to help resolve or contain the current financial
crisis, it may not be a sound policy going forward. If not, skepticism about the
long-term benefits of such authority may cause policymakers to deny it to regulators in the short-term.
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hensive modernization of the U.S. system of financial sector regulation and supervision should take place after the current crisis recedes and should ideally proceed in three conceptually distinct
steps: 1) an in-depth analysis of the current structure, business and
risk profile of the U.S. financial services sector; 2) a reassessment
of the broad policy objectives and substantive regulatory methods
of achieving such objectives; and, finally, 3) a structural reform, or
agency reorganization.
1. Step One: Taking Inventory
As discussed above, an effective program of regulatory reforms requires a clear and thorough understanding of the current
state of affairs in the regulated industry. 1 6 Therefore, it is crucial
that any affirnative recommendations on reforming the substance
or the institutional design of financial regulation be based on, and
grow directly out of, an in-depth analysis of the fundamental trends
in the business and structure of the financial services sector. In
other words, the initial inquiry is "What and whom should we regulate?"
It may be possible to anticipate many of the conclusions of
this inventory-taking exercise, and the recent proposals for financial regulatory reform go far in this direction. The first global
financial crisis of the twenty-first century has made it abundantly
clear that the business and risk profile of today's financial services
industry has changed significantly since the 1930s, when the basic
framework of the U.S. financial regulation was put in place. Various structural factors, including increasing globalization of financial markets, growth of large financial conglomerates with international operations, convergence of financial products and services
traditionally offered by institutions separated by sectoral lines, and
rising importance of institutional investors, have rendered many of
the traditional regulatory boundaries among different categories of
financial institutions such as commercial banks, thrifts, securities
and insurance firms, etc., largely meaningless and inefficient."7
116.
See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 89, at 318-39 (advocating a "[d]etailed
empirical investigation of the industry or program in question" as a crucial first
step of regulatory reform).
117.
See generally U.S. GOv. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-32,
FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY TRENDS CONTINUE TO CHALLENGE THE
FEDERAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE

(2007) [hereinafter GAO-08-32].
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Thus, the first step in the process of a comprehensive regulatory
reform should focus on re-drawing the relevant boundaries within
the modem financial services sector, that is, redefining the relevant
segments of the industry and assessing the key risks inherent in
each segment.
This initial step involves taking an inventory of the financial institutions and key market participants with the goal of developing a thorough, concrete, and up-to-date picture of the financial
industry's composition and operation in the wake of the crisis.
How many commercial banks, securities firms, insurance underwriters, mutual funds and other collective investment funds are
there? What are their average size, geographic footprint, revenue
and asset base, ownership structure, affiliations, regulatory status?
Who are their customers and what types of services do these institutions provide to their customers? What types of financial products do these institutions deal, trade or invest in? Which of these
services and products constitute significant or, conversely, insignificant sources of the financial institutions' revenues, and how is
this changing over time? These are examples of questions
that
118
inventory-taking.
this
of
process
the
in
answered
be
should
This inventory will enable policymakers not only to identify "systemically important institutions" but also to understand the
real reasons that made them systemically important. Most of the
recent regulatory reform proposals would distinguish between systemically important financial institutions and other institutions for
regulatory purposes." 9 Some of the proposals suggest broad criteria for defining which financial institutions are systemically important, individually or as part of a group.'2° Even assuming that it is
118.
Some industry experts calling for a similar inventory-taking as the
necessary initial step in the reform process identify a similar set of key questions. See, e.g., Steven Lofchie, Reinventing Financial Regulation (May 1,
2008) (unpublished paper prepared for the Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft
LLP May 2008 Conference, available at http://www.cadwalader.comlassets/
article/050108LofchieReinventFinReg.pdf) (calling for a "census" of the financial industry).
119.
See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
120.
See, e.g., THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 19 (arguing that
size, leverage, scale of interconnectedness, and role in infrastructure services are
the four key characteristics of "systemically significant" financial institutions);
Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 23-34 (suggesting to use the objective
risk-spillover measure to determine the degree of systemic importance of finan-
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possible to identify such criteria ex ante, actually sorting firms in
or out of this category would presumably require a survey of the
substantive scope of institutions' ongoing business activities.'
Moreover, getting a clear up-to-date picture of all of the activities
of the largest or potentially systemically important financial institutions and their affiliates would also help policymakers understand and gauge the true scale of potential risk to systemic stability
associated with such institutions' activities. 22
Despite its seemingly mundane nature, this is arguably the
most important step in the process of redesigning the financial services sector regulation. Admittedly, this broad inventory-taking is
likely to be the most time-consuming and labor-intensive phase in
the reform process. It will require careful planning, organization
and a truly cooperative long-term effort by the industry and the
relevant policymakers, not an easy feat to achieve. Furthermore,
from a political perspective, calling for an exhaustive study of a
cial institutions). Some proposals simply call for the relevant regulatory agencies to identify systemically important institutions in their relative areas of the
financial markets.
121.
For instance, as the GAO points out:
Identifying which institutions and which of their products and
services pose similar risks is not easy and involves a number
of important considerations. Two institutions that look very
similar may in fact pose very different risks to the financial
system, and therefore may call for significantly different regulatory treatment. However, activities that are done by different types of financial institutions that pose similar risks to
their institutions or the financial system should be regulated
similarly to prevent competitive disadvantages between institutions.
GAO-09-216, supra note 25, at 60-61.
122.
For example, a large financial institution may hold a significant share
of nationwide retail deposits and loan assets, play the key role in the financial
infrastructure (such as, for example, the payments, clearing and settlement systems), conduct major dealing and market-making activities in global derivatives
markets, run sizeable proprietary investment funds, and engage in active trading
and dealing in physical commodities and energy. The sheer size of its balance
sheet and infrastructural functions make this institution "systemically important," which might deflect regulatory attention from its derivatives dealing or
commodity trading businesses. Only a detailed survey of its business activities,
ownership structure, and intra-company transactions can reveal the full array of
potential systemic risks that an institution presents and, ultimately, inform the
regulatory approach to mitigating such risks.
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complex phenomenon, which has a veneer of a tedious and largely
academic exercise, lacks the political payoff potential and the general appeal of putting forward a ready-made policy prescription or
a legislative proposal.
Nevertheless, a thorough empirical examination of the
structure and functioning of the financial industry is an indispensable first step in determining how to regulate it, especially in the
wake of the current global crisis. The very process of a collective,
cooperative inventory-taking can bring together all of the relevant
constituencies-the financial institutions and other private market
participants, federal and state regulators, legislators, consumer advocates, and academics-thereby creating a solid basis for future
collaboration in the formulation and implementation of desirable
reforms. '
2. Step Two: Assigning Priorities, Identifying Rules
Once policymakers have taken a comprehensive inventory
of the post-crisis financial system, they would then need to perform two interconnected tasks: 1) articulate the broad policy objectives regarding the principal risks associated with the types of
business conducted by each identified segment of the financial services sector, and 2) outline the key regulatory tools and methods
available for achieving such objectives. 24 Thus, the key inquiry25 at
this stage in the process is "Why and how should we regulate?"'
123.
In some respects, the process envisioned by the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code provides an early model of the kind of empirically
based, collaborative lawmaking endeavor proposed here.
See WILLIAM
TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 278-92 (1973). It is
important to note, however, that the Code's drafter's did not exactly follow the
model often attributed to them. See Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical
Basis of Article 2's IncorporationStrategy: A PreliminaryStudy, 66 U. CHI. L.
REv. 710, 713 n. 13 (1999) ("[Wlith the exception of seeking (and then ignoring)
the opinions of merchants in hearings on the Code . . .rigorous empirical research into what types of rules would actually be responsive to merchant concerns was never undertaken.").
124.
See, e.g., GAO-09-216, supra note 25, at 49-50 (emphasizing that
reform of financial regulation should be based on detailed reassessment of the
goals of regulation in that context).
125.
In the area of bank regulation, for example, the most familiar of such
regulatory methods include restrictions on commercial banks' investments and
activities, capital adequacy requirements, reserve requirements, limitations on
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At this stage, the conceptual focus shifts primarily to defining the parameters within which various regulatory techniques
guard against or limit specific risks and create the right incentives
and disincentives for private market actors. In effect, this step in
the reform process would involve an evaluation of the utility and
effectiveness of the current, as well as potential, tools of financial
regulation in achieving the newly defined public policy goals in the
complex environment of today's financial markets. A detailed
understanding of the business and risk profiles of modem financial
institutions will allow policymakers to redefine and re-prioritize
regulatory objectives and to align them more effectively with the
risks embedded in financial market practices and activities.
Again, most of the policy objectives that are likely to be
identified at this stage can be anticipated. As the recent reforms
proposals suggest, the list of key policy objectives will likely include some or all of the following: protecting customers of financial institutions from overreaching and fraud, ensuring systemic
stability, preserving the safety and soundness of financial institutions, containing conflicts of interest, and broadening access to and
allocation of credit. This stage of the reform process should build
upon and incorporate theoretical insights and policy proposals advanced by various commentators in recent years, including those
discussed above, 2 6 and should involve a full and comprehensive
examination of those proposals. The reform process advocated in
this Article would thus bring into a sharper focus the critically important debate that is occurring in the midst of the crisis containment and that is frequently overshadowed by the debate over institutional structure of regulatory oversight.
As discussed above, the emerging literature on financial
regulatory reform includes proposals to ensure consistent regulation and supervision, on a consolidated basis, of all systemically
important financial institutions, including currently unregulated
hedge funds and other pools of private capital,' 27 and to revise international capital adequacy standards by raising the quantitative
benchmarks for capitalization and correcting their harmful tendentransactions with affiliates, periodic reporting and public disclosure of financial
information. See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
126.
See supra notes 7-88 and accompanying text (discussing some of the
recent proposals for regulatory reform in the financial sector).
127.
See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 22-24; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27, at 28-32; Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 23-27.
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cy toward procyclicality.'2 This literature also addresses such issues as establishing formal regulatory oversight of over-thecounter derivatives markets," increasing transparency of and enhancing disclosure requirements applying to complex financial
instruments, 30 tightening the rules governing executive compensation in the financial
sector 3' and operation of credit 133
rating agen132.
cies," enhancing the system of consumer protection, and creating effective channels of international cooperation and coordination among financial regulators and supervisors.'4 This body of
literature should serve as a solid analytical basis for the systematic
assessment of the regulatory goals and methods to be conducted at
this second stage in the reform process. When grounded in the
empirical analysis of the risks inherent in the operation of today's
financial services industry, these ideas will inform the process of
designing the regulatory toolkit necessary to achieve the newly
formulated and prioritized public policy goals.
As part of this dual-track exercise of articulating regulatory
objectives and lining up regulatory techniques, policymakers will
have to define and redefine key regulatory boundaries within the
financial industry. Which types of business activities or market
segments should be grouped together and be regulated under a
common scheme? Conversely, which types of activities or market
segments should be separated for regulatory purposes? And
should such activities be conducted in separate entities subject to
different regulatory regimes? These decisions are likely to be
based, among other factors, on the types of risks embedded in the
nature of the given business activities, the dynamics of the relevant

128.
See, e.g., THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 42-43; Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 29-35.
129.
See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 28-30; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27, at 52-53.
130. See, e.g., THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 55-56; Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 51.
131.
See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 37-40; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27, at 40-41; Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 45-49.
132.
See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 40-45; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27, at 50-51; Brunnermeier, et al., supra note 3, at 50.
133.
See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 30-37.
134. See, e.g., MODERNIZING, supra note 3, at 45-46; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27, at 37-38.
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market, and the role of various types of financial institutions within
these markets.
Perhaps the most challenging aspect of this process will be
the need to reexamine the existing regulatory framework in light of
the conclusions policymakers reach about the desirable goals and
scope of financial regulation. The current framework is based
largely on boundaries determined by the legal status of regulated
entities,'35 and it may be necessary to identify alternative grounds
for redrawing such boundaries. Thus, an important element of this
exercise involves assessing the current arrangement of substantive
rules and regulations governing financial markets in relation to
newly compiled empirical industry data. The objective here is to
map out the existing regulatory terrain with a critical view toward
the key points of tension between the regulatory and supervisory
principles and methods on the one hand and the changed risk profiles of financial institutions and markets on the other.
Prior academic studies and recent proposals for financial
regulatory reform have identified a number of such regulatory
points of tension in the existing framework, particularly in the
banking sector. For example, the existing system of regulation
and supervision of commercial banks in the United States is aimed
at protecting the safety and soundness of the banking system. This
aim is fundamentally tied to the need to minimize the risk of bank
runs and other risks posed by the asset-liability mismatch inherent
in the traditional deposit-taking-and-lending model of banking
business. 3 6 Consequently, many of the existing regulatory tools
were designed to shape banks' balance sheets by imposing capital

135.
The existing system of vertical regulatory "silos" in the United States
is sometimes characterized as "functionally-based" or product-based. More
generally, though, in the United States' highly fragmented system of financial
regulation and supervision, the applicability of a specific regulatory regime depends on the type of charter, license, or authorization that is required for an entity to conduct certain business and offer certain regulated financial products and
services. For example, the same function of lending is subject to regulation
under different regimes when conducted by commercial banks, securities broker-dealers, or finance companies. See, e.g., THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note
27, at 34-35.
136.
See generally BROOME & MARKHAM, supra note 23; RICHARD SCoTr
CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING

AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (2009).
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requirements and limitations on investments and activities. 137 Oth
er regulatory policies and institutions were created to help insulate
banks from depositor runs by guaranteeing banks' obligations to
their retail depositors and by providing access to temporary
sources of liquidity. In recent decades, however, large United
States banks have been actively diversifying away from the traditional model of spread-based business of deposit-taking and lending. Increasingly, banks have pursued activities tied to global capital markets, such as investment banking and dealing and trading in
38
equity and commodity derivatives and structured products.
These trends raise a serious question about the continuing ability of
bank regulators and supervisors to monitor and minimize risks inherent in these new, more volatile, lines of banks' business. 3 9
Similarly, the current system of regulation of U.S. securities firms and investment banks generally assumes that they act
primarily as fee-earning agents for third parties participating in
capital markets such as issuers of securities, investors, and so forth.
Thus, the U.S. securities laws are designed to ensure the integrity
of the capital markets and protect U.S. investors, particularly retail
investors, from fraud and overreaching by securities brokerdealers, underwriters, investment advisors, and other types of professional intermediaries.' 4 Since the 1980s, however, investment
banks and securities firms have been rapidly growing other lines of
business, including lending and deposit-taking, securitization,
prime brokerage, derivatives dealing and trading, and have become
increasingly dependent on proprietary trading in a wide variety of

137.

GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 34-35; see also KENNETH

SPONG, BANKING REGULATION: ITS PURPOSES, IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTS

(2000).
138.
See generally Franklin R. Edwards and Frederic S. Mishkin, The
Decline of TraditionalBanking: Implicationsfor Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, 1 FED. RES. BANK N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REv. 27 (1995); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L.
REv. 216 (2002).
139.
See generally GAO-08-32, supra note 117.
140.
For a detailed discussion of the U.S. system of securities regulation,
see generally THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION (2009); LouIs LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES,
SECURITIES REGULATION (2008).
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financial assets.14 ' As a result, the risks these institutions carry on
their books, as well as potential risks they themselves present for
the financial system, are qualitatively different from the risks embedded in the traditional securities brokerage or underwriting business. The disclosure-based regulatory 4regime is arguably not
geared toward addressing these new risks. 1
This much is known. However, these observations are
simply meant to illustrate the types of regulatory points of tension
policymakers should expect to discover in the course of mapping
regulatory goals onto the post-crisis financial system. With the
results of a thorough inventory-taking in hand, policy makers
should be able to successfully identify the weak spots within the
existing regulatory system and the critical mismatches between
that system and risk profiles of modem financial markets.
To be clear, this Article does not advance any concrete hypotheses with respect to the optimal regulatory re-alignment in the
financial services sector. To the contrary, it eschews a reform
process based on such hypotheses. There may be several methods
of drawing the regulatory and supervisory lines: by product or
function, target customer base, size and complexity of operations,
and so forth.' 3 It is essential to keep an open mind about the outcome of this inquiry. In the process of gathering, processing, and
analyzing empirical information about today's financial industry,
the outlines of potential new substantive approaches to regulation
and supervision will inevitably begin to take shape. Once certain
patterns and trends in the structure and dynamics of the financial
markets become more visible, it will be easier to revisit (and per-

141.
See Wilmarth, supra note 138, at 373-74; see also Andrew Tuch,
Investment Banking: Immediate Challenges and Future Directions, 20 COM. L.
Q., 37, 37-46 (2006), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=952243 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
142.
For general discussion of inadequacy of disclosure-based regulatory
regime in the era of complex financial transactions, see Steven L. Schwarcz,
Disclosure'sFailurein the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109

(2008).
143.
The data collected during this initial phase in the process of regulatory reform may suggest, for example, that the main segmentation line in today's
financial services sector should be drawn along the horizontal axis (separating
wholesale and retail financial markets) rather than the existing vertical one (separating different "product" lines).
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haps retire) some of the old ideas on how to fix the regulatory system and to discover new ones.
Finally, it should be emphasized that, at this intermediate
stage in the process of regulatory reform, the ultimate goal is
broader than formulating policy priorities or outlining the contours
of substantives rules governing the conduct of private market participants. It is equally important to identify the most effective and
efficient modes of interaction between the regulators and the regulated, which may vary across different segments of the financial
services sector. Thus, in effect, this step in the paradigm-building
project should be aimed at developing a comprehensive and selfreflective regulatory philosophy. Recent literature on regulatory
philosophy has largely focused on contrasting a more traditional
concept of rigid top-down financial regulation with a more flexible
approach to financial regulation as a cooperative state-industry
enterprise.'" Much of this debate in the financial services context
has revolved around the juxtaposition of so-called principles-based
and rules-based regulation. 45 Not surprisingly, proposals to insti144. There is a growing body of inter-disciplinary scholarship exploring
the increasingly polycentric, negotiated, and collaborative nature of regulation in
modem world. This "new governance" literature is a potentially rich source of
new ideas and approaches to redefining the balance between public and private
governance in the financial services sector. See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRArHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE (1992); Scott Burris, Peter Drahos & Clifford Shearing, Nodal Governance as an Approach to Regulation, 30 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 30 (2005); Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L.
REV. 1 (1997); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the
Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342
(2004); Michael Moran, Understanding the Regulatory State, 32 BRIT. J. POL.
Sci. 391 (2002).
145.
See, e.g., GAO-08-32, supra note 117, at 41-43 (discussing potential
benefits and drawbacks of adopting a more "principles-based" regulatory philosophy in the United States); Henry M. Paulson Jr., Former U.S. Secretary of
the Treasury, Remarks on the Competitiveness of the U.S. Capital Markets at
the Economic Club of New York (Nov. 20, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp174.htm) (contrasting the flexibility and
dynamism of a "principles-based" regulatory approach with the rigidity of the
"rules-based" regulation). For a recent scholarly analysis of potential benefits of
the "principles-based" approach to securities regulation, see Cristie L. Ford,
New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-BasedSecurities Regulation, 45
AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008) (arguing that principles-based regulation is a form of a
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tute a "principles-based" regulatory system in the United States,
drawing heavily on the experience of the United Kingdom's recent
experiment with this approach,'6 led many commentators to question the ideological basis and practical effectiveness of such an
approach.41
The approach advocated here would allow policymakers to
move beyond a retrospective stance and place these crucial questions in a proper empirical context. There are real dangers to identifying an appropriate regulatory philosophy before embarking on a
systematic quest to understand the emerging financial services
landscape. A regulatory philosophy should, ideally, emerge gradually and organically from the analysis and synthesis of the industry data gathered at an initial stage and the assessment of the effectiveness and proper scope of substantive rules and regulatory techniques. Thus, for example, the right balance between top-down
regulatory prescriptions and mandates, on the one hand, and bottom-up private industry self-regulation and self-monitoring, on the
other, may differ across segments of the financial services sector.
Finding such balance depends fundamentally on the dynamics and
risk profiles of individual industry segments (as defined during the
first stage of the reform process), as well as the policy objectives

more collaborative and iterative "new governance" regime in securities regulation).
It is worth noting that, on March 18, 2009, the Chairman of the UK
146.
FSA, Lord Adair Turner, published a report laying out his recommendations for
a regulatory overhaul of the UK's financial regulation and supervision. See THE
TURNER REvIEw,

supra note 29. This report essentially envisions abandoning

UK FSA's "light-touch" approach to regulation in favor of a more intrusive, and
potentially more strictly rules-based, oversight. Id.
147.
See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the
Rhetoric of "Principles-BasedSystems", in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411 (2007) (arguing that any rhetoric
juxtaposing "rules-based" and "principles-based" regulatory systems is, in fact,
misleading and politically motivated); see also JuLIA BLACK, RULES AND
REGULATORS (1997) (suggesting combining different types of rules as one potential strategy for addressing certain inherent regulatory problems, including
the issue of certainty and flexibility in regulation); John Braithwaite, Rules and
Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 47 (2002)

(arguing that legal certainty and consistency of regulatory outcomes in complex
regulatory domains are most effectively achieved through an appropriate mix of
rules and principles, rather than through the use of principles alone).
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and regulatory techniques designed to address the risks specific to
each such segment.
3. Step Three: Designing the Architecture,
Dividing Responsibilities
The final step in developing a new regulatory paradigm
should be to design an institutional regulatory structure closely
aligned with the underlying structure and profile of today's financial services industry and explicitly geared toward achieving the
key policy objectives identified earlier. Thus, "Who should regulate?" becomes the last inquiry in the proposed three-step process
of reforming the financial regulatory paradigm.
Moving the institutional design of financial regulation to
the last stage of the process of developing a new regulatory paradigm would help policymakers avoid recreating any existing misalignments between business realities and regulation. It would also
help them focus initially on the substance of the much-needed legal
and regulatory reform and perhaps help to dampen political battles
over turf and influence. Most important, this approach explicitly
acknowledges that an effective and efficient system of regulatory
agencies cannot be "discovered" in the abstract before one determines the what, whom, why, and how of financial sector regulation.
The ultimate shape of the institutional structure of financial regulation should thus emerge as a logical outcome of the first two steps
in the process, described above.
At this final stage of the reform process, it will be useful to
critically examine the various existing approaches to the structure
of financial regulation and supervision.148 Generally, these include
institutional/functional, integrated, and "twin-peaks" approaches. 49
Under an institutional or functional approach, the jurisdictional
lines of regulation are drawn primarily among different categories
of market participants defined by their legal status (banks, brokerdealers, insurance underwriters, etc.) or among types of products
(banking products, securities, insurance, etc.). This is essentially
the structure currently existing in the United States. An integrated
148.

See, e.g.,

U.S.

Gov. ACCOUNTABnLITY OFFICE, GAO-05-61,

FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER

U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2004) [hereinafter GAO-05-6 1]; THE GROUP OF
THIRTY, supra note 27.
149.
See THE GROUP OF THIRTY, supra note 27, at 34.
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regulatory structure envisions the concentration of regulatory and
supervisory power in a single 'super-regulator," such as the UK
FSA.'O Under a "twin-peak" approach, followed in Australia and
advocated in the Blueprint,regulation and supervision responsibilities are divided between a prudential regulator occupied primarily
with the safety and soundness of financial institutions and a market
conduct regulator focusing mainly on market integrity and prevention of market abuses.551
Another potential alternative that may be added to this list
of structural options is a "three-peak" structure of financial sector
regulation and supervision. In contrast to the Blueprint's model,
this proposal would divide agency powers and responsibilities not
along vertical lines based on the subject-matter of regulation and
supervision ("safety and soundness" and "business conduct") but
along horizontal lines. Under this model, one agency would regulate and supervise the wide variety of retail financial service providers and markets. A separate, smaller and more nimble, agency
would regulate and supervise the wholesale financial services providers and markets in complex financial instruments. These two
agencies would pursue the same general policy objectives, including both safety and soundness of financial institutions and market
conduct. In addition, they would likely utilize similar regulatory
techniques, such as capital adequacy requirements, periodic reporting, and examinations. Yet, their specific policy priorities and philosophies may differ.
A third agency, a systemic regulator, would exercise
across-the-board oversight aimed primarily at preventing systemwide disruptions and ensuring regulatory consistency and general
market integrity across both segments of the financial system. In
addition to providing an integrated framework for the operation of
the two other key agencies, such a systemic regulator would be
responsible, among other things, for regulating issuance of securities, operation of exchanges and trading platforms, rating agencies
and public accounting firms, payments and clearance and settlement systems, as well as monitoring system-wide compliance with
anti-money laundering laws and regulations. Under this scheme,
the systemic regulator would be an entity separate from the central

150.
151.

See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
See BLUEPRINT, supra note 1; GAO-05-61, supra note 149.

924

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 39

bank, whose primary functions would5 be
to conduct monetary pol2
icy and to act as a lender of last resort.
There are many variations of each of these structural arrangements of financial sector regulation and supervision. It is not
the purpose of this Article to propose a definitive structural solution. To the contrary, all models should be on the table and should
be considered as potentially viable alternatives-no single structural proposal should be determined as an a priori superior one.
Once policymakers clearly understand the structure, operation, and
risk profile of the financial services sector, define and prioritize
policy objectives, and identify key clusters of regulatory techniques and methods, it should become significantly easier to assign
regulatory and supervisory responsibilities and draw jurisdictional
lines among regulatory agencies. The ideas and knowledge accumulated in the course of debating the structural reforms in recent
years will be invaluable in informing and shaping this deliberative
process. However, placing these discussions in the context of a
thoughtfully sequenced reform process would prevent them from
obscuring the more fundamental substantive issues involved in
designing a new regulatory and supervisory regime that would reflect and respond to the actual risks inherent in the current business
activities of financial services providers.
C. Managing the Process
The three-step approach to regulatory reform described
above will require a sustained collective effort on the part of all
constituencies with a stake in the financial services sector. As a
practical matter, this may be extremely challenging. It will presumably require, for example, negotiating long-standing differences and entrenched rivalries among various existing regulatory entities. It will also require delicate balancing of a wide range of political and economic interests.
There are ways to organize a reform process to successfully
navigate these challenges, however. It might be desirable, for example, to set up a fully independent panel appointed by and reporting directly to either Congress or the President and comprised of
high-level representatives of all federal and state regulatory agen152.
Although, in some sense, it might be more accurate to describe this
approach as a "four-peak" structure, such description would obscure the fact that
this model does not allocate any supervisory responsibilities to the central bank.
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cies, financial institutions, consumer organizations, and prominent
scholars. Another potential vehicle for conducting the reform
process would be an interagency commission, established and
overseen by the Department of the Treasury or directly by the
President. An interagency commission could bring together the
heads and other designated officials of the federal and state regulatory agencies (including the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the CFTC, the OTS, and so
forth) and include industry and consumer representatives, and academic experts.
It may also be possible to organize a more decentralized
and less formal process of financial regulatory reform that adheres
to basic approach proposed in this Article. A decentralized process
might allocate distinct components of the reform process (e.g., empirical investigation, formulating goals, and designing institutional
structure) to some combination of research and policymaking entities. Such a process would require a broad framework and some
institutional coordinator for reconciling and synthesizing the work
of these various entities.
It is not the aim of this Article to advocate a particular plan
for managing the process of reforming the regulation of financial
markets. Rather, this section suggests some potential arrangements
for managing that process. Whatever form it takes, however, the
entity that manages or coordinates the process of regulatory reform
will need to have sufficient autonomy and authority to do so, perhaps including the power to issue calls for public comment on specific issues, to hear testimony, and to request information it deems
necessary. It would need to have authority to produce reports and
recommendations on the long-term regulatory reforms in the financial sector and to draft legislative proposals based on its findings
and conclusions. This entity should have permanent staff and the
necessary resources to carry out its work in an effective and truly
independent manner. Most importantly, this panel or commission
will need the strong political support of Congress and the President. That political support will itself shape the expectations and
political calculations of the various actors involved in the reform
process and can thereby contribute to its ultimate success.
II.

CONCERNS AND OBSTACLES

This Part notes a number of potential objections and practical challenges to the regulatory approach articulated above.
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Three of these important challenges are essentially variations on a
single theme: the timing of reforms. There is an additional challenge that is not a function of timing: it may be unreasonable to
believe that a comprehensive approach to regulatory reform is
feasible even where there is political will. More modest reforms or
tinkering with the existing paradigm may be the most feasible and
least risky way to bring about beneficial changes in financial regulation.
A. Timing Issues
1. Letting the Cat Out of the Bag. It may be argued that delaying the process of strategic overhaul of financial regulation will
essentially let the cat out of the bag, allowing post-crisis products,
activities, and practices to become entrenched. If regulatory
reform is based on an empirical assessment of re-emergent capital
markets and a comprehensive evaluation of regulatory goals, this
process will likely take a significant amount of time. It is hard to
imagine that such a process could yield meaningful results in less
than a year. There is reason to be concerned that, within this
amount of time, post-crisis arrangements will become settledfinns will consolidate, they will invest in developing particular
products and services, and they will begin marketing these services
and products to other firms, consumers and investors. As a result,
important private actors will become significantly committed to
maintaining these new, perhaps fragile, arrangements. If so, crucial aspects of the post-crisis organization of capital markets may
be impossible to unwind, even if policymakers determine subsequently that they should be curtailed or rearranged. Similarly, allowing financial markets to reorganize after the crisis may squander opportunities to shape the structure of re-emergent financial
firms and markets.
2. The "Stickiness" of Crisis Containment. As noted
above, it is important to remember that this is a moment of economic crisis and to distinguish regulatory reforms from government policies designed to contain and to resolve an acute crisis.
That said, actions taken to contain and to resolve the current crisis
may constrain the regulatory paths and options subsequently available to policymakers in the post-crisis context. This can happen
by design if, for example, policymakers decide to adopt broad
substantive or structural reforms in the midst of crisis. It can also
happen inadvertently. To the extent that crisis containment measures are not expressly made temporary, or if they result in dramatic
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reorganization among market relationships and participants, these
measures can determine fundamental aspects of the re-emergent
environment. Such measures can thus effectively preempt an approach that delays regulatory reform until after the crisis has been
resolved.
3. The Iron is Hot. The current crisis, combined with a new
energetic administration, may provide a unique opportunity to
make comprehensive reforms, and there may be insufficient political will to do so and to override special interests once the crisis
subsides. As noted above, some commentators have stressed that
moments of crisis can be translated into moments of opportunity.
In such moments, the public and political actors may have the will,
or perceive a necessity, to make significant reforms that would
otherwise be met with much greater skepticism or scrutiny. All of
this suggests that policymakers should seize the historical opportunity and strike while the iron is hot, even if it means risking that
the resulting reforms will be imperfect. To some extent, this suggestion contains its own response: why seize an opportunity to risk
making consequential errors? On the other hand, there is an inescapable reality that moments of crisis do focus political will and
that major reforms are exceedingly difficult to negotiate in "peacetime." A process of reform that delays substantive or structural
reforms until after crisis-resolution almost inevitably increases the
political challenges to meaningful reform. It may be that, as a
practical matter, policymakers face a choice between acting quickly and foregoing significant regulatory reforms.
B. Incrementalvs. Comprehensive Reforms
Perhaps the most troubling objection to the process of
reform described above is that efforts to change regulatory paradigms are rarely, if ever, fruitful. The few historical examples of
successful large-scale regulatory overhauls have occurred after
crises of such depth that overhaul was necessary. Consider, for
example, the New Deal that followed the Great Depression or the
creation of the par-value system of currency exchange rates after
World War II. In such a context, policymakers do not really opt
for comprehensive changes to regulation-it is thrust upon them.
More purposeful efforts to undertake a comprehensive reform of a
regulatory paradigm are much more likely to fail in "peacetime."
This is largely due to political factors. The political economy of
regulatory reform may make it impossible to adopt the kind of
fundamental and all-encompassing changes that policymakers
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would prefer, assuming that they can reach consensus to begin
with. Enacting a scheme into law may simply require too many
compromises to private and public actors to allow the scheme to
survive intact. Furthermore, any particular compromise or set of
compromises may undermine crucial aspects of the scheme as designed.
Efforts to change a regulatory paradigm may also be
doomed to fail if comprehensive regulatory reform is by its nature
too complex for any set of individuals to design sucessfully.153
This is more likely to be true when the subject of regulation is itself complex, broad, and diffuse. It is hard to imagine anything
more complex, broad, and diffuse than modem financial markets.
If policymakers aim to address a number of significant substantive
and structural changes as part of one process of reform, they may
risk making numerous errors. If the effects of such errors compound, the ultimate consequence of these mistakes could be tremendous.
The possibility of such consequential failure may ultimately dissuade policymakers from embarking on a deliberate process
to redesign the financial regulatory paradigm. It is worth noting,
however, that this objection applies to many of the current proposals for financial regulatory reform, especially those that envision
significant changes to the institutional structure of financial regulation. If it is true that comprehensive structural reforms are unlikely
to succeed on their own terms, this may suggest that policymakers
should eschew structural or significant substantive reforms in the
short- and intermediate-terms. Instead, it may be preferable to
make incremental adjustments to the existing framework to address
the most salient regulatory concerns and give existing regulatory
actors time to assess the need for future reforms.
It is important to note that the approach proposed here does
not necessarily envision the adoption of a grand scheme of reform.
It is, at most, a grand scheme for comprehensive assessment of
financial markets and potential regulation. The ultimate agenda for
substantive or structural reforms that it yields may or may not be
dramatic, comprehensive or disruptive-that will depend on the
data gathered and regulatory goals identified at the initial stages.
153.
For an interesting and related discussion of "non-linear" and "adaptive" aspects of policymaking, see Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory,
Adaptation,and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913 (2005).
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CONCLUSION

Any of the objections noted above may, in fact, prove to be
insurmountable. Taken together, they certainly do give some
pause. Nonetheless, these concerns arguably frame the fundamental question: are the potential risks and challenges of taking a deliberately gradual and systematic approach to regulatory reform
outweighed by the risks and challenges of taking potentially hasty
actions in the midst of economic crisis? The answer to this question is hardly obvious, which means that there is at least a plausible
case to be made for the process described in this Article and for
delaying significant legislative action aimed at reforming financial
sector regulation until that process has unfolded.
It is fair to say that reforming the regulation of the financial
sector is currently one of the most hotly debated issues on the
policymaking agenda. Proposals for such reform are proliferating,
and the official sector appears committed to adopting at least some
meaningful reforms in the near-term. Broadly speaking, this
movement toward regulatory reform emphasizes the need for structural reforms, outlines specific rules and regulations targeting primarily the perceived causes of the current crisis, and is carried
along by a strong sense of the moment. Rather than add to the
body of institutional and substantive proposals, this Article articulates a strategic approach to regulatory reform as a process of designing and implementing a fundamental change in the paradigm
of financial regulation. That process would begin with a comprehensive survey of emergent post-crisis financial markets. That
inventory-taking would identify the key risks present in various
market segments and would provide the basis for articulating the
desirable substance and scope of financial regulation and comparing the optimal framework with the existing one. Finally, policymakers would employ the current and comprehensive data and
analysis obtained in these first two steps to determine whether, and
how, to reform the institutional structure of financial regulation.
Ideally, such an approach would reduce the potential for unnecessary or unproductive regulatory reforms and help policymakers
achieve the right balance between efficient regulation and crisisprevention going forward.
It may be naive to expect that policymakers, driven either
by genuine commitment to serve public interest goals or by more
narrow political calculations, will forego a rare chance to pursue
regulatory reforms in the immediate wake of the current crisis.
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Nevertheless, the proposal advanced in this Article has a significant pragmatic value. First and foremost, it offers a model approach to redesigning the regulation of financial services sector in
a coherent and measured way. At the same time, even if this approach is not carried out in practice, there may be significant value
in holding it out as a theoretical ideal. It may be, for example, that
articulating an ideal process for financial regulatory reform will
help frame important issues that may influence whatever reform
process is actually undertaken. It may cause policymakers to try to
limit the impact of crisis-containment measures and to reduce the
chances that these measures will constrain future options for
reform. It may also help influence policymakers to eschew an approach that begins with changes to regulatory structure and to focus more on what they perceive will be the significant risks embedded in post-crisis financial markets.

